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Abstract
In 2015 the offence of  possessing extreme pornography (Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 63)
was extended to cover the possession of  pornographic images of  rape. Proponents of  the legislation claim
that rape pornography is ‘culturally harmful’, because it normalises and legitimates sexual violence. Critics
have dismissed ‘cultural harm’ as poorly defined and lacking evidence. However, critical engagement with,
and development of, this concept has been limited on both sides of  the debate.
This article fills that gap through a sustained theoretical exposition of  the concept of  cultural harm and
detailed analysis of  its role in justifying the criminalisation of  rape pornography. It makes the case that at
least some rape pornography is culturally harmful, but nevertheless concludes that criminalisation of  the
possession of  rape pornography is not an appropriate response to that harm.
Keywords: pornography; criminalisation; cultural harm; rape porn; sexual violence;
possession offences.
Introduction
In February 2015 Parliament enacted provisions criminalising the possession of  ‘rapepornography’. Section 37 of  the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (CJCA) extends
the existing offence of  possession of  extreme pornographic images, contained within s 63
of  the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (CJIA) to cover images depicting non-
consensual sexual penetration. The existing offence was introduced in response to
‘increasing public concern’ about the availability of  ‘extreme’ pornography,1 which was
galvanised by the murder of  Jane Longhurst by Graham Coutts, a man described as
‘addicted’ to violent pornography.2 However, while the initial Home Office consultation in
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2005 proposed to criminalise possession of  images of  ‘serious sexual violence’,3 the
resulting offence was limited to pornographic material that portrays sexual interference with
human corpses, intercourse or oral sex with animals, or acts which are life-threatening or
likely to result in serious injury to a person’s anus, breasts or genitals. Consequently, this
offence was critiqued for being both over- and under-inclusive.
The offence in its original form has been viewed as over-inclusive because it
criminalises possession of  images of  consensual bondage, domination, sadism and
masochism (BDSM).4 Many of  the acts covered are legal to participate in, and even to
film, but possession of  that film is a criminal offence under s 63. Moreover, the focus on
depictions of  BDSM activities can be viewed as an attack on the rights of  a sexual
minority to participate in legitimate forms of  sexual expression.5 The offence was
simultaneously criticised as under-inclusive, because it failed to deliver on the promise of
criminalising depictions of  sexual violence.6 The extension to the offence brought about
by s 37 CJCA was an attempt to remedy the latter of  these perceived problems by
criminalising possession of  images depicting penetrative sexual assault.
Following the enactment of  the CJIA, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley published
a detailed critique focusing on its failure to include pornographic depictions of  rape.7
They argued that such images should be brought within the scope of  the offence, and
outlined a rationale for their inclusion termed ‘cultural harm’.8 Cultural harm is an
indirect harm which consists of  rape pornography’s ‘contribut[ion] to a climate in which
sexual violence is not taken seriously’ and in which it may be ‘encouraged or
legitimated’.9 This concept has been extremely influential. McGlynn and Rackley acted
as advisers to Rape Crisis South London’s ‘#banrapeporn’ campaign, which adopted
cultural harm as its central rationale.10 Their written evidence to the Public Bill
Committee11 and the Joint Committee on Human Rights12 cites cultural harm as the
primary justification for legal reform. Clearly, this formulation was persuasive. The
government explicitly cited the influence of  McGlynn and Rackley’s work on its decision
to extend the offence,13 and the Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded its
scrutiny of  the proposed legislation by stating that ‘the cultural harm of  extreme
pornography … provides a strong justification for legislative action’.14
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Given the persuasive force of  cultural harm as a rationale for restricting the
consumption of  pornography, it is striking how little academic attention this concept
has received. McGlynn and Rackley’s writing advocating the criminalisation of  rape
pornography has been prolific, and demonstrates an admirable commitment to making
their arguments widely accessible. Nevertheless, their theoretical exposition of  the
central concept, cultural harm itself, is limited. Perhaps more surprising is the almost
total absence of  critical commentary. The ‘rape pornography’ amendment sparked a
considerable backlash from those who see it as a further erosion of  sexual freedoms, as
evidenced by a number of  submissions to the relevant parliamentary committees.
Several of  these refer to ‘cultural harm’, but their engagement with this concept is
necessarily brief, dismissing it as poorly defined, lacking evidence and therefore an
inappropriate target for criminalisation.15 Meanwhile almost none of  the academic
literature so far generated by the extreme pornography offences engages with cultural
harm in any depth.16
It seems then that the (now enacted) proposals to criminalise possession of  rape
pornography on the basis of  cultural harm generated two polarised responses: uncritical
endorsement of  cultural harm, or at least of  the legislative change it underpins, and
outright dismissal of  cultural harm. Thus, despite the controversial nature of  the
extreme pornography legislation, critical engagement with its central rationale has so far
been minimal. This article fills that gap through a sustained theoretical exploration of
the concept of  cultural harm and its role in justifying the criminalisation of  rape
pornography. The first part of  the article makes the case for cultural harm. I develop a
detailed account of  cultural harm in general and in the specific case of  rape
pornography, concluding that at least some rape pornography is culturally harmful. The
second part of  the article conducts a rigorous analysis of  the rape pornography offence,
arguing that it is not an appropriate response to that harm.
Theorising cultural harm: a general account
Central to McGlynn and Rackley’s cultural harm thesis is the claim that rape
pornography normalises sexual violence.17 If  this is cultural harm in the specific case of
rape pornography, a general concept of  cultural harm could be defined as a type of  harm
which manifests in the normalisation of  attitudes and practices deemed negative. I take
normalisation in this context to refer to a process by which attitudes, practices and/or
ways of  being become accepted as routine, unremarkable or at least understandable
aspects of  everyday life.
The concept of  cultural harm relies on the basic premise that our ideas about the
world, and the ways we can and should interact with it, have a strong social dimension.
This basic premise is widely accepted, and a vast body of  theory is dedicated to
describing the relationship between social forces and individual action. Prominent
examples include Michel Foucault’s concept of  disciplinary power,18 Anthony Giddens’
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structuration theory,19 and an extensive feminist literature on relational autonomy which
emphasises the ways in which both our preferences and our options for pursuing those
preferences are shaped by relations with others.20 Each of  these theories develops the
idea that human action is shaped by, but not entirely determined by, the actor’s cultural
milieu. Particularly useful for present purposes are Ann Swidler’s metaphor of  the
‘cultural toolkit’ and Nicola Gavey’s concept of  ‘cultural scaffolding’.
Swidler’s ‘cultural toolkit’ conceives of  culture as a set of  skills or habits through
which members of  that culture are equipped to pursue particular courses of  action.21
For Swidler, the culture in which an individual is embedded provides templates for acting
which guide individuals’ day-to-day behaviour. These templates also help individuals
make sense of  the actions of  others such that, even if  person B chooses a course of
action that person A would not choose, A can still assess whether that action is within
the normal range of  behaviour or a bizarre deviation.
Gavey developed the concept of  ‘the cultural scaffolding of  rape’ to describe those
dynamics of  normative sexual relationships that make rape easier to perpetrate and
harder to address.22 In Gavey’s account this ‘cultural scaffolding’ consists of  a variety of
intersecting discourses and norms about sexuality; such as the popular belief  that men
have an almost overwhelming sex drive while women view sex as merely instrumental to
maintaining relationships.23 Gavey identifies a wide range of  materials contributing to
these discourses, including mainstream movies and relationship advice columns.24 In
combination, these cultural expectations about male and female needs and desires, and
about the ways men and women should relate to each other, influence the ways
individuals behave and how they interpret the behaviour of  others. Gavey describes two
broad categories of  negative material consequences flowing from this. First, it supports
the prevalence of  rape by fostering attitudes that lead individual men to rape and by
making it easier to deny and disguise rape as ordinary sex. Second, much consensual
sexual activity that does not constitute criminal victimisation is nevertheless constrained
by repressive social expectations and beliefs.
Gavey’s work demonstrates the complex relationship between text, culture and action
at the core of  the cultural harm thesis. Put bluntly, no one was ever compelled to rape
by reading Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus.25 However, this text along with myriad
other cultural artefacts does shape popular understandings of  male and female
behaviour, particularly in relation to sex and relationships. In turn, individuals respond
to these ideas in a wide variety of  ways. They may, for example, consciously reject them,
or feel ashamed of  their desires and discouraged from articulating them, or be
emboldened to be more demanding and aggressive. The influence of  culture on action
is unpredictable and difficult, if  not impossible, to measure. Nevertheless, while
individual texts do not compel specific actions, they do contribute to the set of  cultural
resources that individuals draw upon when interacting with the world around them.
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‘Cultural harm’ refers to the development of  cultural resources which underpin harmful
interactions with others.
The 2016 EU referendum provides the context for a recent example of  this type of
harm. Various texts connected to the Leave campaign (including speeches, campaign
posters, newspaper columns etc.) served to normalise racist and anti-immigrant attitudes
through the messages conveyed. These messages are communicated through substantive
claims, as well as through visual and linguistic imagery.26 Specifically, these texts depict
white working-class Britons as victims, and migrants as both an economic threat and a
security threat.27 Britons of  colour are erased from this narrative entirely.28 While it is
not possible to empirically measure the impact of  any individual text on public attitudes,
it can be confidently asserted that texts which perpetuate the narrative of  white Britons
suffering hardship as a result of  mass immigration contribute to a climate which
validates racist and anti-immigrant sentiments.29 Moreover, the portrayal of  these
attitudes as understandable and reasonable responses to deprivation – i.e. as familiar
resources in the ‘cultural toolkit’ – discourages others from challenging expressions of
racism. Cumulatively, these texts contribute to the cultural scaffolding which supports
the manifestation of  racism and xenophobia in material harms such as discrimination
and hate crime.30
Thus far, I have outlined what I believe to be a relatively modest and uncontroversial
set of  claims: first, that our attitudes and behaviour are shaped by the cultures in which
we are embedded. Second, these cultures are partly constituted by texts (broadly defined)
and other cultural artefacts. Third, some of  our cultural resources shape our attitudes
and behaviour in negative and/or harmful ways. It is submitted that these three claims
form the foundation upon which cultural harm is based. In the following section I
explore how this concept has been operationalised in the specific case of  objections to
rape pornography.
The cultural harm of rape pornography
Moving from the basic concept of  cultural harm to its use as a rationale for the
criminalisation of  possession of  rape pornography requires the acceptance of  an
additional, and more contentious, claim: that ‘rape pornography’ is a distinct, identifiable
category of  material that makes a sufficiently significant and harmful contribution to the
cultural climate to justify criminalising its possession. As stated above, the central claim
made by proponents of  extending the CJIA to cover images of  rape is that this material
normalises sexual violence. It is purported to do so by conveying various messages about
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rape and sexual violence: that it is arousing, entertaining, not seriously harmful, and that
it is a legitimate form of  sexual expression. This section scrutinises the messages
embodied in rape pornography, arguing that there is a strong case that at least some of
this material is culturally harmful.
TEXTS’ MESSAGES
One way in which rape pornography is said to legitimate sexual violence is by presenting
rape as a form of  entertainment, which downplays the severity of  sexual violence.31
Images that portray coercion as a route to pleasure could plausibly be read as condoning
and minimising sexual violence. There is, however, a disconnect between this claim, and
the specific examples of  rape pornography that proponents of  the offence focus on.
Campaigners primarily target material which is explicitly advertised as rape pornography,
hosted at websites titled ‘brutal rape’, ‘savage rape’ and the like.32 The relevant images,
as described by Holly Dustin and Fiona Elvines, commonly depict physical violence and
visible signs of  distress and pain.33 These texts do not easily lend themselves to a reading
of  rape as not serious harm. Quite the opposite in fact: pornographic depictions of  rape
advertised with descriptions such as, ‘innocent teen girls face their worst sex related
nightmare’, and, ‘all the girls are violently raped, they cry and resist without any mercy
from the rapist’, portray rape as highly destructive.34 Indeed, revelling in the infliction
of  serious harm appears to be a central theme, and one with which proponents of  the
offence are also concerned.
According to campaigners, rape pornography does cultural harm by glorifying and
eroticising sexual violence.35 On the face of  it, this appears to be a fairly straightforward
claim: if  pornography consists of  texts that are designed to arouse, then rape
pornography presents rape as a source of  sexual arousal and pleasure. Moreover, images
which depict women ultimately enjoying pain and coercion present rape as pleasurable
for both rapist and victim.36 McGlynn and Rackley assert that image descriptions further
glorify sexual violence, citing as an example, ‘see what happens when men lose control
and don’t give a f*ck whether she says yes or no. Damn, in fact, the guys enjoy a “no”
more’.37 This text portrays the violation of  another person’s sexual boundaries as
something to be enjoyed and celebrated, and implies that the victims do not matter. The
claim that all rape pornography inherently ‘valorises forced sex’38 is not, however,
beyond dispute.
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Feona Attwood and Clarissa Smith note that simply presenting this claim as fact
obscures ‘particular assumptions about the ways in which these sites may be meaningful
to those who view them’.39 They raise two overlapping criticisms of  the assertion that
rape pornography necessarily valorises rape. First, it assumes texts have singular
identifiable meanings, and second, it overlooks the role of  fantasy in viewers’
engagements with pornography. McGlynn and Rackley do, in fact, acknowledge that the
process through which rape pornography conveys messages and shapes attitudes is not
straightforward or linear. Not everyone who views rape pornography will respond to it
in the same way, and rape pornography is only one element in a constellation of  cultural
artefacts that influence views about sex and sexual violation.40 Nevertheless, the
assertion repeated throughout the cultural harm literature that rape pornography
normalises, legitimates and eroticises sexual violence does paint a somewhat rigid picture
of  static meanings located in individual texts. By contrast, critiques of  the extreme
pornography legislation have emphasised the ‘disparate’ ‘meanings and significances’ of
this imagery, and the diverse motivations of  consumers.41
There is consensus across the debate that pornography, like any text, is open to
multiple interpretations and meanings, and that this process of  meaning-making is
shaped by the context – the social structures and hierarchies of  power – in which the
text is produced and consumed.42 It is also shaped by ‘the ability of  both producers and
audience members to make certain interpretations and meanings more possible than
others’.43 Indeed, if  we understand meaning-making as interactive, then something must
come from the text; the viewer is not equally free or able to make any interpretation.
Thus, while any given text may be capable of  embodying a multiplicity of  meanings,
some interpretations will be considerably more plausible than others. If  we accept that
individuals interpret, use and are affected by rape pornography in a variety of  ways then
we must surely accept that for a decent proportion of  viewers their reading of  the
images hosted on rape porn websites is as simple as ‘rape is sexy’. It is also tolerably clear
that this interpretation is encouraged by the content of  the images and the way they are
marketed. When this is understood, the attribution of  specific, seemingly static meanings
to rape pornography becomes more persuasive. People of  all genders can and do interact
with pornographic images of  rape in a number of  ways, but surely one of  the most
obvious and straightforward readings of  the images targeted by the campaign is that they
celebrate sexual violence and present it as a source of  sexual pleasure.
Attwood and Smith also highlight the role of  fantasy in the consumption of
pornography. Arguably, there is a difference between presenting simulated rape as
something which it is pleasurable to watch and actual rape as something which is
pleasurable to do (or be subjected to). Replace rape pornography with action movies –
the type with minimal plot or character development but lots of  stunts and special
effects – and this becomes easier to grasp. These films are clearly designed around the
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idea that watching shootouts, explosions and elaborate fight sequences acted out is enjoyable
and exciting, but it would be a leap to assert that they present real life violence as
something that is enjoyable to see or experience, or that viewers typically interpret action
movies in this way. Similarly, knowledge that a rape scene is simulated by performers
who are, in fact, consenting, is crucial to the enjoyment of  some viewers of
pornography.44
Not all pornography consumers are particularly concerned about performers’
consent, however.45 Moreover, conscious awareness that a text depicts fantasy does not
prevent it from influencing our ideas about the world or about how to relate to each
other. When Hollywood movies depict fantasy, that should not stop us being concerned
about any racist, misogynist or homophobic tropes they perpetuate. At the other end of
the scale, the fictional worlds of  film and television are often credited with raising
awareness and positively shaping attitudes towards real world phenomena.46 I argue,
therefore, that acknowledging the twin roles of  fantasy and viewer agency in the
consumption of  pornography is not fatal to the cultural harm thesis. Viewers interact
with images in complex ways to produce a range of  meanings. Nevertheless, this should
not blind us to the fact that the text itself  contributes something to that process and to
the wider cultural milieu. In the case of  much rape pornography, that contribution
includes the idea that rape is a source of  sexual arousal.
It is questionable, however, whether all pornographic depictions of  rape can be said
to promote this idea. Advocates of  the legislation appear to have some doubts about
this. As noted above, the campaign concentrated on a particular subset of  rape
pornography – that which is hosted on so-called ‘pro-rape’ websites, featuring rape
scenes which ‘are often presented as real’.47 McGlynn and Rackley distinguish this
material from ‘consensual BDSM imagery’.48 Similarly Dustin and Elvines explicitly
differentiate ‘rape pornography’ and ‘BDSM porn videos’, noting ‘discernible stylistic
differences between the two’, despite the fact that both ultimately contain simulated
scenes of  non-consensual sex.49 It is unclear what criteria were used to define these two
categories in order to carry out the comparison.
These attempts to delineate sub-categories of  rape images call into question whether
rape pornography is a clearly identifiable category of  material after all, and whether
everything within that category necessarily ‘valorises’ rape. Attwood and Smith view this
‘division of  the imaginative realm into “harmful” and “harmless”’ as masking a
moralistic distinction between appropriate and inappropriate sexual fantasies,50
exemplified for them by McGlynn and Rackley’s assertion that ‘these rape sites are poles
apart from the “rape” fantasies of  women in books such as Nancy Friday’s My Secret
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Garden’.51 I am rather more sympathetic to the idea that some pornographic depictions
of  rape may genuinely be more harmful (and/or less redeemable) than others. However,
the differences between categories of  content, and the significance thereof, must be
carefully articulated. This is particularly so if  they are to form the basis for criminal
intervention, as I explore in the final section of  this article. 
According to the cultural harm thesis, criminalisation is justified not solely because
rape pornography sends undesirable messages, but because the absorption of  these
messages into the cultural environment in turn facilitates various material harms. In the
following section I explore the material harms that have been linked to rape
pornography in the cultural harm literature and the nature of  this connection.
RAPE PORNOGRAPHY AS CULTURAL SCAFFOLDING
I argued above that the concept of  cultural harm has many parallels with what Nicola
Gavey refers to as the ‘cultural scaffolding’ of  rape.52 The metaphor of  scaffolding is
used to describe the structural support that enables and facilitates the commission of
sexual violence. It consists of  a set of  norms, shared expectations and understandings
about how people can and should relate to one another. Gavey also argues that this
cultural scaffolding supports lower-level injustices and inequalities, that it shapes our
day-to-day sexual interactions in limiting and negative ways.53 Proponents of  the rape
pornography legislation, while not adopting Gavey’s terminology, effectively view rape
pornography as a significant component of  the cultural scaffolding of  rape. From a
cultural harm perspective, rape pornography plays a role in facilitating sexual assaults,
obstructing their successful prosecution, and more broadly influencing (hetero)sexual
interactions and contributing to the devalued status of  women in society.
The claim that rape pornography facilitates or supports the commission of  rape is
not a claim that viewing this material directly causes individuals to commit rape.54 The
cultural harm thesis is not premised on a ‘texts and effects’ model in which individual
texts have measurable effects on individual brains. This model underpins many feminist
objections to pornography, but has been extensively critiqued due to its flawed methods
and inconclusive results.55 Moreover, as Karen Boyle argues, many of  the premises on
which effects research is based are at odds with the theory and epistemology of  anti-
pornography feminism.56 By contrast, cultural harm posits an indirect, diffuse,
cumulative contribution of  rape pornography, alongside myriad other cultural artefacts,
to shared social attitudes and values. This relationship is more complex than a claim of
direct harm and contains an additional mediating step: rather than individual texts
(step 1) directly influencing the behaviour of  viewers (step 2); individual texts (step 1)
contribute to a cultural climate (step 2) which shapes the behaviour of  individuals (step
3). The cultural harm literature provides limited detail about the process by which the
cultural climate shapes the behaviour of  individual perpetrators of  rape. Nevertheless,
my analysis of  this literature reveals two aspects to the process: The cultural climate
imbued with rape pornography shapes the sexual preferences of  individuals, and it
removes barriers to committing rape.
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Indicative of  the notion that a culture imbued with rape pornography shapes sexual
preferences, McGlynn and Rackley quote with approval the then government position
that ‘extreme pornography “may encourage” an interest in “violent or aberrant sexual
activity”’.57 On first reading this seems very close to a claim that ‘extreme’ pornography
causes people to rape, or at least to want to rape. However, the authors’ stated concern
is with the wider cultural impact – that this may ‘contribute to a climate in which sexual
violence is not taken seriously’58 – rather than with effects on individual viewers.
Moreover, the cautious assertion that pornography may encourage an interest in
particular sexual acts is in line with the conclusions of  several critics of  the legislation.
Attwood et al cite one reason for viewing pornography as the ‘exploration of  the
possibilities and opportunities for sexual feeling; finding out about what interests and
arouses and excites’.59 Beyond this specific debate, pornography has been celebrated as
a tool for exploring and developing sexual subjectivity and resisting normative sexual
expectations.60 It therefore seems naive to deny that pornography may also influence
some problematic developments in individual sexual preferences, such as a sense of
entitlement to others’ bodies or a desire to inflict pain. Nevertheless, any impact on
individual sexual preferences is at best marginal to the cultural harm thesis.
More compelling is the notion that the messages conveyed by rape pornography to
the culture at large break down barriers that would otherwise inhibit the commission of
rape. The central claim of  the cultural harm thesis is that it normalises and legitimates
sexual violence. Prohibiting this material is advocated as a means to communicate that
sexual violence is unacceptable.61 The argument is that the ‘proliferation and tolerance’62
of  rape pornography enables would-be rapists to believe that their desires are widely
shared, and that they will not be judged or sanctioned if  they commit sexual assault. This
echoes much bystander intervention work, in which a primary tactic for challenging
violence and bigotry is to demonstrate that the perpetrator’s views and actions are not
endorsed by the general public.63 From a cultural harm perspective then, the issue is that
rapists may come to believe that their actions are widely endorsed.
A cultural harm approach is not limited to considering the influence of  rape
pornography on potential rapists, however. It is concerned with the attitudes and
responses of  a much wider collection of  actors. These include the police, lawyers, judges
and jurors who must decide whether a given incident constituted rape in law; the peers
with the potential to challenge misogynistic, violent or insensitive behaviour and
remarks; the friends, partners and families in whom a victim may confide; and the
victim-survivors coming to terms with their experiences. This broad focus clearly sets it
apart from simplistic direct harm approaches. Maria Garner and Fiona Elvines argue that
a culture saturated with rape pornography makes it more difficult for victim-survivors to
disclose,64 while McGlynn and Rackley state that it ‘leads to a society where, at the very
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least, rape is less likely to be recognized as rape . . . where it is less likely to be
investigated, where rape myths are harder to challenge’.65 Thus, the cultural harm
argument is not simply that rape pornography encourages individuals to commit rape,
but rather that it exacerbates harm to victim-survivors and facilitates the commission of
rape by making it more difficult to effectively censure and punish.
Frustratingly little detail is given, however, about why this might be the case. The
barriers to disclosure for rape victims are complex, and include shame, stigma, desire to
protect relationships, fear of  not being believed or taken seriously, as well as first-hand
experience of  that fear being realised. The argument that the existence of  rape
pornography impacts these barriers is asserted without any explanation as to how it does
so, or why its impact might be particularly significant. After all, consciousness of  the
woefully high attrition rate, or horror stories about the investigation and trial process are
also likely to discourage disclosure.66 Similarly, the argument that the existence of  rape
pornography makes it harder for police, juries and even victims to recognise rape when
they see or experience it is not explored in any depth. This claim might have more weight
if  the campaign focused on pornographic images which portray coercion as a standard
aspect of  sexual activity. Instead, it targets scenes specifically described and marketed as
rape scenes, leaving little room for doubt that the behaviours depicted would be criminal
if  carried out for real.
An alternative way in which rape pornography can be read as legitimating sexual
violence is through the reification of  gender and sexual roles. Garner and Elvines cite
rape pornography as an influence on the everyday practices of  ‘doing gender’.67 In other
words, it influences viewers’ ideas about appropriate masculine and feminine behaviour.
Specifically, pornography that portrays the sexual coercion of  women by men provides
a template for how men can relate to women in a sexual context, for what we might call
‘doing heterosexuality’. Such images construct masculinity as aggressive, and male
sexuality as acquisitive, dominating and violent. Meanwhile female sexuality is portrayed
as either non-existent (the women in the films are represented as sexual objects rather
than sexual subjects) or masochistic (the women are depicted enjoying force, pain and
humiliation).68 Sexual violence against the women is thus presented as acceptable, either
because they enjoy it, or because they and their wishes simply do not count.
The claim that rape pornography shapes practices of  ‘doing gender’ and ‘doing
heterosexuality’ is complicated by the fact that pornographic depictions of  sexual
violence are not limited to images that portray men as aggressors and women as victims.
This has led some critics to take issue with the emphasis on violence against women in
the campaign against rape pornography. Myles Jackman argues that ‘fram[ing] the debate
in terms of  violence against women . . . excludes the experiences of  male and transsexual
rape survivors’.69 I share Jackman’s concern that discourses and policy frameworks
which locate rape as a form of  male violence against women can serve to marginalise
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male, non-binary and trans70 victim-survivors, as well as those victimised by female
perpetrators. Acknowledging and addressing the ways that gender structures experiences
of  sexual violence without reducing all sexual violation to one homogeneous narrative is
an ongoing challenge. In this case, however, the focus on violence against women
appears to be a deliberate choice based on the content of  the material rather than a
careless elision of  sexual violence with violence against women.
Dustin and Elvines found that rape pornography is a prevalent genre on
pornographic websites, and that it overwhelmingly depicts men as perpetrators and
women as victims.71 Thus, it is the pornography itself  that reduces sexual violence to a
homogeneous narrative of  male violence against women, rather than the campaigners.
This homogeneity is central to understanding the operation of  cultural harm. It is
through systematic repetition and accumulation that a given attitude, practice or mode
of  being takes shape and gains significance among the constellation of  available cultural
resources. Thus, the impact of  each individual image may be negligible in isolation, but
the cumulative effect of  widespread repetition of  the image of  male (hetero)sexuality as
domineering and violent is to solidify this way of  performing masculinity as one resource
in the cultural toolkit.
This argument nevertheless leaves a number of  issues unresolved. First, Attwood
et al have questioned whether rape pornography is as pervasive as the campaign
suggests. They note that it is unclear whether Dustin and Elvines analysed pornographic
images or just their titles and descriptions, and question whether the content itself  ever
actually existed.72 Second, the claim that rape pornography disproportionately portrays
male perpetrators and female victims is also contentious. Dustin and Elvines analysed
the top fifty freely accessible ‘rape porn’ sites, i.e. websites which explicitly describe their
content as rape pornography. They found that on these sites, 100 per cent of  those
depicted being assaulted were female, while 98 per cent of  those taking the role of
perpetrator were male.73 Yet this assumes that pornographic depictions of  rape are
limited to content which expressly markets itself  in those terms, and returns us to the
question I raised above: what counts as rape pornography? Third, irrespective of  what
proportion of  the ‘rape pornography’ category they constitute, what are we to make of
images which fall outside the male perpetrator/female victim paradigm? Do they also
normalise sexual violence? Could they subvert or challenge gender norms or are they just
more of  the same? The answers to these questions have implications for the appropriate
scope of  any criminal offence.
I have established that at least some rape pornography conveys a message that sexual
violence is a legitimate source of  sexual pleasure, notwithstanding the fact that not all
viewers will passively absorb this message. In light of  this, I caution against simply
dismissing the idea of  cultural harm. Those of  us with an interest in tackling sexual
violence should take seriously the cultural harm of  rape pornography and pay attention
to possible strategies for combatting that harm. With this in mind, the final section of
this article considers the specific strategy that was advocated by proponents of  the
cultural harm thesis and adopted by Parliament in 2015: the criminalisation of
possession of  pornographic images of  rape.
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Criminalising rape pornography
Critiques of  the criminalisation of  rape pornography have primarily focused on the lack
of  evidence that it causes harm.74 By contrast, I have argued above that (some) rape
pornography is culturally harmful. My concern is with how that harm should be
addressed, specifically whether criminalisation of  possession is an appropriate response.
Paradoxically, some of  the most compelling claims of  the cultural harm thesis
undermine the case for criminal intervention.
First, cultural harm is cumulative in nature. Individual texts do not directly lead to
harm, rather the proliferation of  similar images has a combined effect of  reifying and
normalising particular behaviours and ways of  being sexual. The systematic repetition of
themes, such as the male perpetrator–female victim configuration highlighted by Dustin
and Elvines,75 points to inequalities at a structural level. This suggests individual
consumers may be the wrong target.76 Second, the cultural harm of  rape pornography
shares some similarities with the normalisation of  racism and homophobia through texts
such as news articles, political campaign speeches and fictional representations.77 Indeed,
I have argued above that these are also forms of  cultural harm. Yet English law
criminalises the expression of  hatred or bigotry only in very limited circumstances,78 and
takes an even more restrictive approach to criminalising the possession of  materials
expressing or endorsing such views.79 Third, the cultural harm thesis identifies rape
pornography as one among ‘any number of  factors’ which normalise sexual violence.80
Thus a justification is needed as to why this factor should be criminalised but not others.
The cultural harm thesis identifies a particular wrong, and has been used to advocate
for the criminalisation of  possession of  rape pornography as a manifestation of  that
wrong. However, if  some manifestations of  this wrong are to be criminalised but not
others, this needs to be done on an explicit, clear and principled basis. With this in mind,
the final sections of  this article scrutinise the specific provisions that criminalise the
possession of  rape pornography, through the lens of  cultural harm.
POSSESSION: PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS
Section 63 of  the CJIA is unique in that it criminalises the possession of  various
categories of  pornographic material. The rationale for targeting possession was that,
while the production and distribution of  these images is prohibited by the Obscene
Publications Act 1959 (OPA), this Act does not apply to content produced and hosted
on websites outside of  England and Wales. Criminalising possession has therefore been
framed as the closure of  a legal loophole created by the development of  internet
technology. This framing implicitly accepts that criminalising the production and
dissemination of  rape pornography is justified, an issue which there is not scope to
address here. Nevertheless, even if  there were consensus that the dissemination of
certain forms of  pornography should be prohibited, it cannot be assumed that the
rationale can be straightforwardly transposed to the criminalisation of  possession.
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Under the cultural harm framework set out above, the contribution of  producers and
distributors is straightforward: they perpetrate cultural harm by facilitating the spread of
the harmful messages contained within rape pornography. The role of  consumers is less
obvious. One way in which it could be said that the possession of  rape pornography is
a form of  culturally harmful conduct is that possessors expose themselves to harmful
material, and in so doing allow themselves to be influenced by its themes. This way of
understanding the wrongfulness of  possession echoes the OPA’s much critiqued
emphasis on the tendency to ‘deprave or corrupt’,81 and as Alex Dymock notes, forms
part of  a broader trend of  criminalising dangerousness rather than harm itself.82 Indeed,
McGlynn and Rackley openly acknowledge that the offence targets the risk of  harm.83
McGlynn and Ian Ward have argued that this is entirely consistent with J S Mill’s
formulation of  his harm principle, so often relied upon to challenge the criminalisation
of  pornography.84
I agree that the criminalisation of  risk is sometimes appropriate; I argue, however,
that two threshold conditions must be met: first, that the harm risked is of  a type and
level of  severity that would warrant criminalisation were it to materialise; second, that
there is a sufficiently close link between the activity to be criminalised and the harm
risked by engaging in that activity. Possession of  rape pornography fails to meet both
these conditions. According to the cultural harm thesis, the risk associated with the
possession of  rape pornography is that the act of  possession fosters a set of  troubling
attitudes about sex and sexual violence, and that these attitudes can manifest in conduct
that is harmful; for instance, insensitive responses to disclosures of  sexual violence,
jokes or dismissive comments about rape, and decisions not to report, charge, prosecute
or convict when rape takes place. However, holding these attitudes is not in itself  a
crime, nor is expressing them or acting on them in the ways described. If  these attitudes
and behaviours are not worthy of  criminalisation (i.e. they do not clear the threshold of
being sufficiently harmful), it cannot be appropriate to criminalise a person who merely
exposes themself  to the risk of  developing such attitudes.
There is a further stage in the cultural harm thesis, as detailed above: these attitudes
and behaviours encouraged by rape pornography in turn lead to more rapes and sexual
assaults taking place. This meets the first criterion: rape and sexual assault are clearly
harms of  a type and severity that justifies criminalisation. But here the second criterion
is not met. The nexus between possession of  rape pornography and the commission of
rape (by either the possessor or a third party) is not sufficiently strong to justify
criminalising the possessor on the basis that they risk contributing to the proliferation
of  rape in society. Compare the criminalisation of  drink-driving. Drink-driving offences
criminalise the risk of  harm rather than harm itself. But were that risk to materialise in
injury to persons or damage to property there would be a clear, direct link between the
driver’s conduct and the harm caused. By contrast, when the risk of  possessing rape
pornography materialises in the form of  a rape taking place, there is no such direct link.
Rape pornography contributes to the commission of  rape by fostering attitudes and
behaviours that, alongside numerous other factors, normalise and legitimate sexual
violence. The diffuse, indirect nature of  the relationship between rape pornography and
incidents of  rape is central to the concept of  cultural harm and is precisely what
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distinguishes it from the heavily contested claim that viewing pornography directly
causes individuals to commit rape. However, the remoteness of  this relationship
between the conduct and the relevant potential harm makes criminalisation an
inappropriate response.
The wrong of  possession can alternatively be framed in terms of  creating a demand
for pornographic images of  rape. However, this formulation merely increases the
remoteness between the offender’s action and the ultimate harm: the prohibited conduct
carries a risk of  encouraging the production of  materials that send messages that may
contribute to the shaping of  attitudes and behaviours that may, indirectly and in
conjunction with numerous other factors, contribute to an increase in the prevalence of
rape. Moreover, encouraging the commission of  an offence by a third party is already
prohibited under ss 44–46 of  the Serious Crime Act 2007.
Criminalising possession on the basis of  risk also raises questions about who poses
a risk to whom. Dymock argues that locating the risk of  cultural harm within specific
individual consumers of  pornography, through criminal prohibition, sits in tension with
the framing of  cultural harm as a systemic problem.85 She identifies a logic of  deviance
underpinning the construction of  viewers as exceptional and therefore dangerous.86 At
the same time, an important strand of  the anti-(rape) pornography discourse constructs
consumers themselves – specifically children and vulnerable adults – as at risk. Protection
of  children is a key framework through which concerns about pornography are
expressed.87 In the campaign against rape pornography this is exemplified through
appeals to research for the Children’s Commissioner which found that young people are
‘engaging in riskier sexual behaviour as a result of  viewing pornography, are uncertain as
to what consent means and develop harmful attitudes towards women and girls’.88 Yet
prohibiting possession offers no additional protection for children and instead provides
a means to criminalise them. 
My concern with the criminalisation of  possession then is not that there is no harm
to be addressed. Rather, the very nature of  cultural harm means that there is an
insufficiently strong nexus between individual conduct and the manifestation of  harm to
justify criminalisation. In addition, it runs the risk of  criminalising some of  the victims
of  cultural harm. Just as the diffuse nature of  cultural harm makes it difficult to identify
individuals as specifically responsible for that harm, it also presents challenges for
identifying specific forms of  media or categories of  content that are exceptionally
harmful. It is to these difficulties that I now turn.
DANGEROUS PICTURES
The offence in question does not prohibit depictions of  rape in all forms of  media, it
applies only to pornographic images. Section 63(3) CJIA defines ‘pornographic’ as ‘of
such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or
principally for the purpose of  sexual arousal’. The Act, therefore, distinguishes between
verbal and visual, and between pornographic and non-pornographic depictions of  rape.
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In addition, images covered by the Act must be ‘explicit’ and the persons depicted must
appear real to the reasonable person,89 meaning that animated pornography is exempt.
In this section I argue that the cultural harm framework does not provide a justification
for these inconsistencies. Furthermore, there are potential negative consequences of
singling out pornographic images.
A key strength of  the cultural harm thesis is its recognition that social attitudes and
practices are shaped by a wide range of  media and other cultural artefacts, and the
interplay between them. Yet s 63 specifically singles out pornographic images, implying
that their contribution to cultural harm is in some way unique. Within the literature
advocating the criminalisation of  rape pornography, this is largely assumed rather than
articulated. Assurances are given that prohibition would not and should not apply to
cartoons or to non-pornographic works,90 but it is unclear why these should be
automatically exempt. Indeed, a UN report used to bolster the claim that rape
pornography is culturally harmful, states that:
Images in the media of  violence against women, in particular those that depict
rape or sexual slavery as well as the use of  women and girls as sex objects,
including pornography, are factors to the continued prevalence of  such violence,
adversely influencing the community at large, in particular children and young
people.91
This implies that pornography is one among a number of  media forms that convey
culturally harmful messages about gender roles and sexuality.
This is clearly the case. Take, for example, the popular sitcom How I Met Your Mother.
Many of  the show’s jokes revolve around the (often successful) tactics used by the
character Barney Stinson to persuade women to have sex with him. These include
propositioning women who are heavily intoxicated (such that their capacity to consent
may be compromised), and carrying out numerous elaborate deceptions including lying
about his gender, and claiming ‘sex with [him] would cure their nearsightedness’, either
of  which would vitiate consent for the purposes of  a rape charge in English law.92 The
idea that these actions could constitute sexual assault is never explored within the show.
Notwithstanding occasional expressions of  disgust from other characters, Barney’s
actions are presented as a source of  comedy for the characters and audience alike.
Meanwhile the women who are taken in are presented as bimbos who got what they
deserved. This example serves to illustrate that images which legitimise rape by using it
as a form of  entertainment, minimising its harms and making it difficult to recognise
sexual violence as sexual violence are not exclusive to pornography. Why then, should
pornographic depictions of  rape be treated as exceptional?
One obvious distinction between the example above and ‘rape pornography’ is that
the former does not depict sexual activity itself, only characters discussing it, and is not
explicit. However, as s 63 already requires images to be ‘explicit’, this does not explain
the need for an additional requirement that they be ‘pornographic’. The example above
also calls into question whether ‘explicit’ images are necessarily more harmful. The
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specific focus on materials designed for sexual arousal makes sense within a direct harm
framework, which theorises that viewing rape pornography conditions men to be
sexually aroused by rape and therefore makes it more likely that they will commit rape.
But, as explained above, the weaknesses of  direct harm arguments have resulted in the
emergence of  cultural harm as a more robust framework for understanding the potential
harms of  rape pornography. Under a cultural harm framework, which theorises that the
consumption of  rape pornography and social and legal tolerance thereof  normalises and
trivialises sexual violence, it is unclear why depicting rape as a source of  sexual arousal
is inherently more problematic than portraying it as a source of  comedy. 
An alternative rationale for the specific focus on pornography could be that, whereas
rape pornography overwhelmingly depicts rape in ways that trivialise and/or promote
sexual violence, depictions of  rape in other media are more varied. Rape in mainstream
film and television ranges from sensitive portrayals of  the trauma of  sexual violence and
the resilience of  survivors, to its use as little more than a titillating plot device. By
contrast, if  pornography is by definition produced for the purpose of  sexual arousal,
then pornographic depictions of  rape must invariably portray rape as arousing. It could,
therefore, be argued that all rape pornography conveys messages which are culturally
harmful, whereas only some non-pornographic depictions of  rape do so. Such an
assertion is difficult to reconcile with a literature which, as discussed above,
acknowledges the heterogeneity of  pornographic depictions of  non-consensual sex,
attempting to distinguish ‘BDSM imagery’ from ‘rape porn’. It also fails to explain why
pornographic texts or illustrations which glorify rape should be treated differently from
explicit and realistic images which do the same. The cultural harm framework does not
provide a principled basis on which to distinguish explicit pornographic images from
non-pornographic works.
Inconsistency in the criminal law without a principled basis is undesirable. It is unfair
to invoke the criminal sanction against consumers of  image-based pornography but not
against consumers of  other equally harmful materials. In this instance, the inconsistency
has additional undesirable consequences. In singling out pornography, the offence
abstracts rape pornography from the broader context of  misogyny and gendered
violence in which it is created and viewed. Garner and Elvines, arguing in favour of  the
rape pornography amendment, claim that ‘pornography which depicts rape, sustains a
culture in which rape and sexual violence is normalised and perpetration is framed as an
expression of  sexual desire rather than as a criminal offence expressing gender
inequality.’93 Paradoxically, by focusing on pornography alone, the ensuing debate
situates the consumption of  rape pornography precisely as a contested sexual desire,
with argument over whether that desire is legitimate and harmless or deviant and
dangerous. Notwithstanding the fact that anti-pornography feminists view rape
pornography as intimately connected with wider structures of  gender inequality and
violence, the offence itself  obscures this connection by prohibiting rape pornography as
one among a number of  categories of  extreme pornography, as opposed to one among
a number of  categories of  misogynistic material. As such, it positions sexual deviance,
rather than misogyny, inequality or violence as the core of  the problem.
Given that the cultural harm framework does not provide a basis for distinguishing
pornographic from non-pornographic depictions of  rape, it could be argued that all
culturally harmful depictions of  rape should be criminalised, rather than just those
which are pornographic. Such an offence would potentially be very wide-ranging and
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would be unlikely to attract the broad coalition of  support that was mobilised behind the
criminalisation of  rape pornography. In addition, as explained in the previous section,
there would still be an insufficiently close nexus between the possession of  culturally
harmful materials and the manifestation of  the type of  harms that would warrant
criminalisation. There could perhaps be scope for more restrictive criminalisation along
the lines of  the offence of  possessing racially inflammatory material.94 The difficulty
would be identifying what material counts as culturally harmful.
The rape pornography amendment seeks to solve this problem by using a set of
criteria about the type of  material (explicit, pornographic, images) and its content (rape
or assault by penetration) as proxies for identifying culturally harmful material. However,
singling out pornographic images is not an effective way to do so. It overlooks much
equally harmful material, and implies that sexual deviance rather than inequality and
misogyny are the root of  the problem. In the final section, I argue that singling out
images of  rape and assault by penetration similarly overlooks other culturally harmful
materials and runs the risk of  perpetuating stereotypes about what a ‘real rape’ looks like.
‘REAL RAPE’ AND ‘REALISTIC’ RAPE
Cultural harm locates the harms of  pornography in its eroticisation of  violence against
women. This framing has roots in the radical anti-pornography feminism of  the 1980s.
Then, as now, feminists emphatically rejected the framework of  obscenity and its
emphasis on morality, disgust and offence. Their objection to ‘pornography’ was not an
objection to all sexually explicit materials, only to sexualised representations of  the
subordination of  women.95 The most prominent example of  this approach is the anti-
pornography civil rights ordinances drafted by Catharine McKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin, which defined pornography as the ‘graphic sexually explicit subordination of
women [or men, children or transsexuals]’.96 This vague definition was accompanied by
a list of  additional criteria, at least one of  which must be met for materials to come
within the scope of  the ordinance. Examples include ‘women are presented
dehumanised as sexual objects, things or commodities’ or are ‘presented in postures or
positions of  sexual submission, servility, or display’.97 However, as with the overarching
definition, these criteria are far from clear-cut or uncontested. The radical feminist
definition of  pornography therefore lacks certainty and is difficult to apply consistently.
A ‘categories approach’ to the regulation of  pornography, as embodied in the CJIA,
appears to offer a solution.98 The Act designates various categories of  pornography as
‘extreme’ by reference to the particular acts depicted, for example, intercourse with
animals and acts which are life-threatening.99 Whilst questioning some of  these
categories, McGlynn and Rackley endorsed the underlying approach and identified
depictions of  rape as one category which should be included.100 Thus, rather than
targeting all pornographic materials which might sexualise subordination, they have
effectively singled out a subset – rape pornography – that unequivocally does so. There
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may be debate at the periphery about whether depictions of  particular postures or
activities are inherently degrading. Pornographic images of  rape, however, are framed as
conclusively in the subordination camp, so obviously do they ‘glorify violence against
women’.101
The categories approach works by using a relatively clear-cut category as a proxy for
a more complex one. Similarly, legal age limits are often used as a substitute for more
nuanced assessment of  individual capacity or readiness, on the basis that the age limit is
easier to apply and roughly maps on to the category it is standing in for. Here,
‘pornographic images of  rape and assault by penetration’ stands for the category
‘materials which are culturally harmful because they normalise sexual violence’. I argue
that rape pornography is a poor proxy for this category of  material because a) its
parameters are not sufficiently bounded, and b) it does not map closely on to the
category it is used to represent.
The relevant category of  extreme pornographic images is defined under s 63(7A) of
the CJIA as follows: 
(7A) An image falls within this subsection if  it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, either of
the following— 
(a) an act which involves the non-consensual penetration of  a person’s vagina, anus or mouth
by another with the other person’s penis, or 
(b) an act which involves the non-consensual sexual penetration of  a person’s vagina or anus
by another with a part of  the other person’s body or anything else, 
and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real.
Operationalising this category thus requires the fact-finder to consider whether the
image is explicit, whether the physical acts depicted fall within those specified above (i.e.
is sexual penetration involved?), and whether the persons appear to be real. These
questions will be relatively straightforward in most cases. Crucially, however, fact-finders
must also consider the more complex questions of  whether the acts are portrayed as
consensual, and whether they are portrayed in a realistic way.
The criminal justice system is notoriously bad at identifying actual instances of  rape
with sufficient certainty for a criminal conviction. A vast literature details the significant
attrition at every stage of  the criminal justice process.102 While the reasons for attrition
are complex, the challenges associated with proving the complainant’s lack of  consent
are often a key factor. In a rape case, the investigation and subsequent trial attempt to
determine whether the complainant consented based on the evidence before them. This
usually includes testimony from the complainant about their state of  mind at the time
of  the incident, testimony from the complainant, defendant and any witnesses about the
parties’ behaviour, and any relevant physical evidence. Research shows the various fact-
finders in the process draw on stereotypes about rape and gendered expectations about
sexual behaviour to make sense of  this evidence.103 As a result, rapes that closely
resemble the ‘real rape’ stereotype – where the defendant is a male stranger who uses a
weapon and/or extreme physical force, and the complainant is a sober, chaste woman
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who resists verbally and physically to the utmost of  her ability – are more likely to be
prosecuted and convicted.104
In a rape pornography case, there is no complainant to testify as to whether they
consented. There are only the actions, and possibly words, of  the characters as depicted
in the images. The real rape stereotype is thus likely to take on a much greater role here
than it does in rape and sexual assault cases. Images depicting the most extreme levels
of  physical violence (many of  which would be covered by other extreme pornography
categories), and obvious reluctance and resistance on the part of  the victim, are much
more likely to be identified as rape pornography than images depicting more subtle
forms of  coercion, or where consent is more ambiguous. As highlighted above, this
tendency was already present in the campaign to ban rape pornography, which
concentrated on stereotypical depictions of  rape as examples of  the material it sought
to prohibit. Furthermore, the legislative decision to restrict the offence to depictions of
non-consensual penetration diminishes the seriousness of  non-penetrative sexual
assaults. There is a danger then that operationalising the ‘rape pornography’ category will
simply perpetuate the real rape stereotype. As such, the law itself  would send a culturally
harmful message.
McGlynn and Rackley advocate the insertion of  a context clause, modelled after the
Scottish extreme pornography provisions, to help clarify whether an image is prohibited.
This would explicitly allow reference to be made to ‘how the image is or was described’,
to assist in determining whether it depicts non-consensual penetrative sexual activity.105
Such a clause would narrow the rape pornography category, as material not explicitly
advertised as ‘rape porn’ would be less likely to be covered. This would not lessen the
impact of  stereotypes, because material marketed as rape porn and/or hosted on
dedicated ‘pro-rape’ websites tends to closely resemble the real rape stereotype. It could,
however, incentivise marketers to describe images in ambiguous language (e.g. ‘rough
sex’ rather than ‘rape’). This would make it easier for consumers to unwittingly download
images of  rape, placing them at risk both of  prosecution and of  exposure to culturally
harmful themes. Arguably, it would also make the images themselves more culturally
harmful if  pornography depicting sexual coercion was advertised as images of  sex rather
than rape, implying that coercion is an acceptable feature of  sexual encounters.
The requirement that depictions of  rape be ‘realistic’ imports further confusion
about the parameters of  the offence. This is separate from the requirement that the
persons must appear real (ruling out illustrations).106 How is realism to be interpreted in
this context? Do poor acting or overly glossy production values place an image outside
the scope of  the offence? What of  unrealistic scenarios such as a victim enjoying being
raped? This is a common pornographic narrative and one that has been highlighted as
particularly harmful.107 Does realistic mean ‘presented as though it is real’? Jackman
favours this interpretation, and uses the presence of  credits at the end of  pornographic
films to emphasise that the scenes are simulated by actors.108 By contrast, McGlynn and
Rackley claim ‘realistic’ includes images that are simulated, and advocate making this
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explicit in the legislation.109 Nevertheless, they devote particular attention to sites that
present images as though they are real.110
A focus on images that are presented as though they are real appears to conflate two
different forms of  wrongdoing. A defendant who knowingly possesses images that he
believes to document an actual rape (unless intending to submit them as evidence of  a
crime) is in a different moral position to a defendant who possesses rape images that he
believes to be simulated. The first defendant participates in the continued violation of  a
victim of  rape, and also creates a demand for further rapes to be committed and
filmed.111 The second defendant, as discussed in my analysis of  the wrong of
possession, exposes himself  to a set of  harmful messages that may negatively influence
his attitudes to sex and sexual violation, and incentivises production of  culturally
harmful materials. I argued above that this type of  wrongdoing is too remote from a
relevant form of  harm to justify criminalisation. However, given that the CJIA does
criminalise this form of  wrongdoing, it is unclear why a distinction is drawn between
realistic and unrealistic depictions. Unrealistic depictions of  rape, including animation,
are not immune from conveying the types of  misogynistic and violent messages
identified as the cultural harm of  rape pornography. Thus, the requirement that images
be realistic renders the parameters of  the rape pornography category less clear, and does
not help to delineate culturally harmful from benign depictions.
The identification of  various subgenres of  pornography casts further doubt on the
coherence of  ‘rape pornography’ as a legal category. As discussed above, some advocates
of  the amended offence acknowledge the plurality of  pornographic depictions of  rape,
in particular seeking to distinguish consensual BDSM images from rape pornography.
Dustin and Elvines’ preliminary findings showed that the former is more likely to feature
‘hints of  consent’, as well as women taking active roles and experiencing pleasure.112
McGlynn and Rackley appear to differentiate rape fantasies in which female pleasure is
central from the material hosted on ‘pro-rape’ websites.113 Critics of  the offence have
also argued that BDSM materials should be placed outside its scope. Zoe Stavri, for
example, highlights the trend within BDSM pornography to show performers discussing
how they would like an upcoming scene to play out, and reflecting on it afterwards.114
Stavri cites this visible process of  ‘negotiation and boundary-setting’ as a means of
modelling positive consensual sexual encounters to viewers.115
It appears then that some pornographic images explore themes of  power, consent
and violence in ways that do not legitimate or minimise sexual assault. Do such images
still qualify as rape pornography? It could be argued that a BDSM ‘rape scene’
bookended by footage of  the performers discussing their willingness and enjoyment is
not a depiction of  non-consensual sex at all. The current law lacks clear guidance on this
point. It could alternatively be argued that such scenes do depict rape, but do not do so
in ways that encourage or make light of  sexual violence, and are therefore not culturally
harmful. If  this is the case, the legal category ‘rape pornography’ does not closely map
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the set of  images that are culturally harmful. Under s 63, the only relevant distinction
between one pornographic image of  rape and another is whether it is ‘grossly offensive’,
‘disgusting’ or ‘obscene’.116 This criterion provides some flexibility to exclude images
from prohibition,117 but it is a deeply flawed and unreliable mechanism for
differentiating culturally harmful from benign materials.
This analysis of  the parameters of  the rape pornography category demonstrates that
it is not fit for purpose. It is unclear which images will qualify as rape pornography or
how such images are to be identified, and there is a high likelihood that criminal justice
agents will rely on myths and stereotypes, which are themselves culturally harmful, to aid
their determinations. As a proxy for culturally harmful pornography, the rape
pornography category is both over- and under-inclusive: It excludes images of  non-
penetrative sexual assault and in practice is likely to exclude images that do not conform
to the real rape stereotype, including images which portray more subtle forms of
coercion and reluctance as standard aspects of  a legitimate sexual encounter.
Paradoxically, there is little to prevent BDSM rape scenes in which the participants’
preferences and boundaries are explicitly negotiated from being brought within the
scope of  the offence.
Conclusions
Some media, including some pornography, is culturally harmful. I have articulated a
theory of  cultural harm grounded in social theory that relies on the following three
claims: first, that our attitudes and behaviour are shaped by the cultures in which we are
embedded. Second, these cultures are partly constituted by texts (broadly defined) and
other cultural artefacts. Third, some of  our cultural resources shape our attitudes and
behaviour in harmful ways. It is certainly difficult to identify the specific contribution
made by individual cultural artefacts, but it is nevertheless possible to analyse the
messages conveyed by a particular text and to assess the likelihood that those messages
are culturally harmful. Thus, it is possible to identify many pornographic depictions of
rape as culturally harmful.
I am, however, sceptical about criminalisation – and specifically the rape
pornography offence under s 63 of  the CJIA – as a strategy to combat this form of
harm. I have argued that the mere possession of  culturally harmful material is too
remote from the materialisation of  a sufficiently serious harm to justify criminalisation.
I have also argued that there is not a clear case for singling out rape pornography for
criminalisation. Whilst there is a high likelihood that material placed in this category will
be culturally harmful, this is also true of  many other pornographic and non-
pornographic texts. If  there is to be any legal response to culturally harmful media, it
should be based on a framework that recognises the links and intersections between
misogynist, racist, classist and other harmful tropes, and their expression across all
forms of  media. Instead, we have a legal framework that assumes that sexually arousing
images are especially dangerous.
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